Fichte's Philosophy

          In the Enciclopedia Libre Universal en Español, on the Internet, one can find an outline of an article about Johann Gottlieb Fichte, written by an anonymous author, which, as I was reading it, reminded me of things that seemed to have been taken as notes to my classes about History of Contemporary Philosophy at the University of Oviedo (Spain). It is only an outline with mistakes, inaccuracies, lack of connection in the order followed, etc. For this reason, I have decided to complete it and give it a more finished form. I do this because I am especially interested in Fichte, because he puts the operatory activity as the origin of our rational knowledge and because he is one of the most distorted and worst understood great German classic philosophers, who still awaits today for someone who will show him to us in his true depth and present philosophical importance. Moreover, a summary of his philosophy may serve as an appetizer in the face of the 200 anniversary of his death, which take place this year. The outline of the Encyclopedia would read as follows:

It is well-known the great influence that Marxism had during the twentieth century. Marx was in his intellectual origins a left Hegelian. For this reason Hegel was very important to understand Marxism and he was deeply studied, for he was seen as the one who brought to completion the philosophy initiated by Kant. The philosophers who were in the middle, Maimon, Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling, were seen, however, as mere intermediary links. But this in not so, at least in the case of Fichte and Schelling. They are something more than that, although still today they are far from achieving a fair treatment with respect to Kant and Hegel, both broadly recognized as great giants of modern thought.

Notwithstanding, Hegel's star seems to decline with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failure of the socialist experiment that seemed to be more influential. A Hegel that, it cannot be forgotten, also influenced the fascist movement. Because, although the fascist theories opposed the marxists, there is also in their base an interpretation of the Hegelian theories. On the other hand, it looks like Schelling's criticism made in his Munich and Berlin lectures against Hegelian philosophy starts to be taken seriously.

However, we will focus in what follows in the figure of J. Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). He is presented as a passionate follower of Kant, whom he went to visit in Könisberg, walking from Poland, and asked for help, given his precarious financial status. Kant offered him to publish, under his recommendation, his essay Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, which would make him famous as a young writer. Nevertheless, good old Kant would publish an article rejecting Fichte's philosophy as not continuing his, by the time already famous, critical philosophy. Furthermore, this happened at a very critical time in Fichte's live, when he was accused of atheism and was forced to resign his chair in the University of Jena. He had been promoted there by Goethe, at the time minister of Culture in the Duchy of Weimar, on which the university depended. Goethe wanted to put the University of Jena at the forefront of German culture and promoted the access to its chairs to Schelling and Hegel, who will be the great philosophical stars after Fichte's stunning five years (1794-1799) in Jena.

Fichte's philosophy starts from Kant, but developing ideas of its own. Something similar to what happened to Malebranche and Spinoza with Descartes. Although Fichte doesn't accept the background of Spinoza's philosophy, his work is very influenced by him. Spinoza was famous for being an atheist and a pantheist, which motivated the interested of the youth of the time in his work, although Spinoza had been treated in the eighteenth century, in Lessing's words, as a “dead dog” and all sort of refutations of his work had been developed. However, he was saved as a great philosopher by Lessing himself in an interview posthumously published by Jacobi, which produced a great controversy and scandal (See Manuel F. Lorenzo, "La polémica sobre el espinosismo de Lessing", El Basilisco nº 1, 1989, pp.65-74), attracting the interest in his famous Ethic among the young Germans.

Fichte was one of those youngster that read and studied with great interest Spinoza's work. He read it critically, for, after Kant's “Copernican Revolution”, it is only possible a critical philosophy that does not admit knowledge of “things in themselves”, as Spinoza's God Substance was, located beyond all human experience, real or possible. However, Fichte consider that Spinoza offered the best model of a good foundation for Cartesian philosophy and took his ideas to a deeper and more coherent expression. For Fichte Kant's philosophy was also not well founded, because it offers new answers, but it departs from obscure premises. There are in Kant some contradictions, as Jacobi had pointed out. According to Kant, only in the phenomenal world is it legitimate to talk about causality. Nevertheless, as he explains the theory of knowledge, he considers that there is a matter of knowledge (sensations) that are manifestations of the “thing in itself” which is behind and beyond the phenomena. That is, for Kant something noumenal, the Thing in Itself, is the cause of phenomenal sensations, applying thus improperly the causality, which can only be applied to the relations among phenomena, to the relations among the unknowable noumenal world and the phenomenal.

Moreover, the unity of the famous three Kantian Critiques is a false unity by juxtaposition based in Tetens' theory of the three psychological faculties. Fichte intends to find a unity in Kantian philosophy in a strictly philosophical manner, rationally coherent and complete.

However the reformulation of Kantism leads him to a choice between two Ideas which preside in Kant the division of reality in two worlds: the phenomenal and the noumenal. The Idea of the I (Transcendental Ego) and that of the Thing in Itself. If we depart, as the primary Idea, from the Thing in Itself we fall into a pre-critical philosophy similar to Spinozism. But if we depart from the I we can reconstruct the World in a critical and limited way, as the world of phenomena. Not as a world in itself, but rather as the world such as it appears in the representation (Vorstellung) that we make of it. Furthermore, Fichte reenforces this choice with the claim that concerning philosophical issues we cannot remain neutral, but rather we must choose the philosophy that is in accordance with the type of person we are. In that case, those who advocate for that everything remains as it is, for fatalism, will choose a dogmatic philosophy based in the permanent and eternal Substance from which everything comes with necessity, being pointless to rebel. However, those who advocate for liberty and change, will choose to depart from the operative liberty which is attributed to the I, facing a world that can be changed. Fichte chose the I. In such a sense, Fichte's philosophical position was viewed sympathetically by the advocates of the French Revolution, which had taken place at the time, and view with suspicion by the politically reactionary positions, which gave him an aura of audacious thinker surrounded all his live by controversy.

Fichte substitutes, then, Spinoza's Substance, the God-creative Nature, for the human I. The I now take the relative place occupied before by the divine substance in Spinoza, but this does not mean that Fichte understands the I as a spiritual Substance, in the manner of the Cartesian cogito, but rather he understands it as action, as operatory activity (Tathandlung), from which it is derived, not anymore the World, but rather our representations of the World. Such an I, which Fichte calls the Absolute I, is not anymore the psychological or empirical I, but rather the Kantian Transcendental I that encompasses all my representations and has the task of making the synthesis of intuitions and concepts according to schemes of the creative imagination. The world, not in itself, but such as it appears to us, is then constructed-constituted by human subjects themselves.

Fichte performs an “ontological turn” which complements Kant's gnoseological “Copernican turn”. And he does this inverting Spinoza. Because, Kant, besides excelling above all in analytical genius, as Fichte himself recognized when he compared him with Reinhold's synthesizing “genius”, was not particularly impressed by Spinoza's philosophy, whom he had not read or studied directly, according to his own confession, and he knew about him above all through indirect references. The young Fichte, however, was attracted by the famous controversy about “Spinozism” and Lessing. That which attracts Fichte about Spinoza is the rigorous and precise form of ordering more geometrico his philosophy. In such a sense, Fichte will try to order the content of the new Kantian philosophy, inclined still towards the baroque aristotelic-scholastic molds that had been renovated in the Germanic philosophical world by Christian Wolff, in a non scholastic form of exposition and development. A form which was more in accordance with the new way of systematic founding and exposition introduced by Descartes, with his hypothetical-deductive model from the cogito as a fundamentum inconcusum, to extract from it, in the form of rigorously demonstrated propositions, as Spinoza did, the new philosophical contents resulting from Kantian criticism. In turn, the geometrical deduction will be substituted by the new dialectical deduction that Kant had introduced in his Critiques in order to escape from the antinomies and contradictions to which the superficial Cartesian rationalism lead.

Under these cirsumstances the “ontological turn” that Fichte introduces will consist in substituting the Spinozist Substance by the Kantian transcendental I. The task of a critical philosophy will not be anymore, as in the Spinozist metaphysic, to deduct the entire reality from the Deus sive Natura, but rather philosophy must abandon such metaphysical reveries in order to undertake tasks that are more humble, but more humanly achievable, such as departing from human consciousness in order to try to deduce, not anymore the world as it is in itself, but rather how it is for us, the world as representation (Vorstellung). In this Fichte continued the steps of Reinhold, who he succeeded in the chair of Jena, although having to essentially modify the so-called Principle of Consciousness (Satz des Bewusstsein) that was understood by Reinhold as an nondeductible Fact (Tatsache), being ingeniously interpreted by Fichte as an Action (Tathandlung). Neither the Kantian Thing in itself, which Reinhold had brilliantly discarded, nor the Reinhold's “facts of consciousness”, are the origin of human knowledge. Rather, for Fichte, only the actions of the I are the origin of human knowledge. Action is the essence of the I in the specific sense that action is not understood as another property of the I among others, but rather that the I is itself essentially activity, and for that reason his philosophy is a philosophy of action, a sort of pragmatism avant la letter that overcomes the Cartesian-Kantian dualism, because the I itself derives, constitutes itself and constitutes the world through his actions. This way, Fichte is the first of the great philosophers which tries to explain human knowledge, not from the mere sensations or innate Ideas, but rather from the actions of the human subject itself, in a sense which will be taken up again by Jean Piaget in his famous Genetic Epistemology.

Fichte tries to reconstruct systematically Kant's work departing from the Transcendental Ego as a critical foundation of which we can have experience, a cognitive experience of a psychological or “mental” origin. He imitates Spinoza when he tries certain logical formalization of such cognitive experience through logical-deductive principles. But such Principles are not fixed metaphysically. They must be extracted from experience, from what happens when we know something. Fichte asked his students to look at the wall and to analyze what happens in such perceptive act: an I who perceives a Not-I. Then he asked them to remember such act. In the remembrance a new I appears who perceives himself in the moment in which he was looking at the wall. This new I is a reflexive I in which the subject unfolds himself and puts himself as an object. Even if we continue to introduce new acts of knowledge as that of an I who remembered that he was looking at the wall, and so forth, an I different from the reflexive I will not appear. For this reason the first principle of Fichte's philosophy is “the I puts the I”. Said in a Cartesian way: I reflect, therefore I exist. The I produces or generates the I itself, consciousness produces consciousness. This way the first principle of Fichte's philosophy is the reflexive identity:

 

I = I (First Principle)

 

However, the I does not produce consciousness from himself, as if it were a spiritual Substance or a divine Spirit, as in Berkeley, but rather, something needs to be presupposed that forces him to do so. For this reason, a resistance presents itself against the I in his actions, an unknown “Thing in itself” which already appears in the perceptive I as the “wall” and that Fichte prefers to call Not-I, for we cannot know positively what it is. In fact, according to Fichte, the positing of a Not-I derives, not from knowledge, as in Kant, but rather, it is a belief which derives from a feeling of encountering something that resists our actions. This way he introduces a sort of “infinite Substance” as something a posteriori, unlike Spinoza who departs from it. Therefore, the second principle of Fichte's philosophy is: “the Not-I opposes the I”:

 

(I/NOT-I) (Second Principle).

 

The I is threatened by the thing in itself, by the Not-I, in the same way as the Island of Reason, which Kant talked about, was threatened by mysterious oceans of unknown limits. We cannot know the Not-I and the only thing that we can say about it is that it is not the I.

However, the ceaseless activity of the I would not make sense confronted with an indivisible, infinite and unembraceable Not-I, as the “thing in itself” of the old metaphysics. For this reason it is necessary, in the Kantian sense, to restrict knowledge to the faith world of the phenomena given to consciousness. Hence Fichte introduces a “postulate of limitation”, understanding that the opposition between the I and the Not-I only has sense when it is given within the I, between a divisible I and an indivisible Not-I. The contradiction between the I and the Not-I cannot be considered in a general and indeterminate manner, for it would be a contradiction between two infinities. The opposition I and Not-I must be limited and given in the I. According to this the Third Principle is: “in the I a divisible I opposes an indivisible Not-I”:

 

I(I/NOT-I) (Third Principle).

From his Third Principle Fichte reorganizes the whole Kantian philosophy. Fichte tries to reconstruct from this Third Principle all the representations of consciousness, whether theoretical or practical. This way the Third Principle I(I/NOT-I) can be interpreted in two ways: if we suppose the Not-I as acting over the passive I we obtain the representations of theoretical knowledge that Kant analyzes in the Critique of Pure Reason. If, on the contrary, we suppose an active I acting over a Not-I which presents a passive resistance to it, we obtain the moral representations, or practical in general, analyzed by Kant in his other two critiques.

REAL SERIES: I (NOT-I → I)

IDEAL SERIES: I (I → NOT-I)

The Real Series of necessary representations focuses on how sensation, perception, imagination, concepts, etc. are produced. The Ideal Series of practical representations has to do with the genesis of ethical, moral, political, juridical, etc., representations.

These are Fichte's rational principles of subjectivity that remain constant throughout his work, the famous Three Principles of his Doctrine of Science (Wissenschaftslehre) laid out in 1794. With them he intends to explain rationally the totality of human knowledge, both our theoretical cognitive representations and our practical, organizing systematically the novel results that Kant had reached in his famous three Critiques, but not in a monist way, as Reinhold intended with his famous Principle of Consciousness (Satz des Bewusstsein), but through a dialectical construction of Three Principles that “close” or narrow the field of human knowledge in a way that we could compare to Structures of rational explanatory principles, such as, for example, the famous Three Principles of Newtonian Mechanics, in which, from the same principles a set of theorems are proven. Fichte, imitating Spinoza, will conceive of the proven truths of his Philosophy as Theorems, although these proofs don't follow the geometric mode, but the dialectic of the thesis, antithesis and synthesis which Kant had begun.

However, Fichte's three principles are not a merely logical-formal deduction, but a reproduction of the dialectical development of human knowledge itself which is evident when we observe the structure outlined by the Three Principles, interpreting the First as a Thesis or starting opposition (I=I); the second as a negation of such thesis (I/Not-I); the Third as a result of the Synthesis of both: I(I/Not-I).

For this reason, the most adequate method for philosophy, according to Fichte, is the dialectical method. Fichte sees philosophy as a constructive and synthetic activity which advances, with the application in all its territories of the dialectical method; although he introduces a form of founding idealist philosophy and more related to an anthropological foundation than to an ontological, his work is entirely original and novel. His brilliant use of the dialectical method against the analytic will end up influencing, through Hegel, Marxism, who will popularize it. The importance of the dialectical method manifests itself in that, for Fichte, “philosophy is not only a system of thought, a mere collection or connexion of Propositions (Sammlung von Sätzen) that can be learned, but rather, a view of things (Ansicht der Dinge), a special mode of thought (Denkart), a dialectical mode of thought, that we can reproduce in ourselves” (J. T. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre nova método, Felix MeinerVerlag, Hamburg, 1994, p. 11). This way he picks up the well known Kantian distinction between knowing philosophy and knowing how to philosophize.

Fichte applied the principles of his Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre) to his political theory (The closed commercial State), to his moral philosophy (Ethics), to law (Foundation of natural Right), but not to nature. This will be done by his brilliant young follower in Jena, Schelling, but giving birth to a very different philosophy to the Fichtean, just as Hegel remarked in his work The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy (1801).

As much as Fichte rejects Spinoza's philosophy as a pre-critical philosophy, nevertheless, his agrees with him in the defense of freedom of thought: the State must allow all rational opinions. The tradition of modern democratic ideas is born with Spinoza, with his opposition to the religious and political fanaticism of his time. Although Spinoza was a famous and influencing figure during his short life, he was later outcast and treated as a “dead dog” because of his radicalness and heterodoxy. Fichte also wrote an Ethics, according to the principles of his Doctrine of Science. There he follows Kant's critique to “material ethics” that would put pleasure or happiness in this life as a reward for virtue. Kant puts virtue and not happiness at the centre, following this way the stoic tradition which claims that the reward to virtue can only be virtue itself. This way a “formal ethics” is defined which demands following the Categorical Imperative of moral law requires doing the good without getting any material reward in exchange. But Kant also considers that the highest good should include Happiness and not only Virtue. He sees in the Christian belief in the reward in the afterlife, in the life of the pure noumenal world of resurrected spirits, a compensation, not material (phenomenal) but purely spiritual (noumenal), for those who follow the virtuous life. According to Fichte this is a relapse in a naïve Christianity that presupposes a God who can be bought with diligence, etc. For him, happiness or the blessed life (The Way Towards the Blessed Life, 1806) is the satisfaction of duty well done. This way the reward is neither material nor formal: it is the pure feeling of satisfaction that is based not in pleasing a personal God understood as a judge of rewards and punishments, but rather, in a feeling of Love towards a God who is nothing different from the Moral Order of the World, with whom Humanity has to identify itself in is continuous improvement process and rational progress. Such an Idea of a purely rational God was introduced by Fichte in order to scape from the accusation of atheism made against him and which caused, under strong pressures, his proudly voluntary resignation and cessation, - not “expulsion” as it is usually said -, from the University of Jena.

It is true that since the strong Kantian critiques to the Proofs of the Existence of God, a kind of split between Philosophy and Theology starts, but the then prevailing political positions and the religious mentality in the Germanic world, in contrast to the French, for example, prevented the development of a philosophy exempt of theology. Shelling and Hegel learned from the religious attacks that Fichte had suffered and for this reason they use in their works an ambiguous onto-theological language with the aim of avoiding conflicts with the religious communities, both protestant and catholic, by which the Germans still remained divided. But the reason for the greater importance of religion in Fichte's work after his period in Jena also has its motives in weaknesses in his own philosophy. It is true that Fichte doesn't use the analysis of the I as a mere founding Cartesian springboard which still needs to lift itself to a theological instance, to the existence of a rational and good God who warrants the evidences of the I, but it is rather the case that, after the Kantian demolition of the so-called “ontological argument” of the existence of God, which Descartes still accepted, Fichte proposes a dialectical and internal foundation to the I's own world, similar to what Husserl will call an Egology, maybe in opposition to Theology. That is, the logical reconstruction of Subjectivity and the world of objects as cognitive representations according to purely philosophical-rational principles.

Nevertheless, when Fichte tries to reconstruct the world of the alter egos, of intersubjectivity, through the category of “recognition” (Anerkennung) – taken and later made famous by Hegel in his well-known “Dialectic of Master and Slave” in the Phenomenology of Spirit -, he is forced to appeal, as a warrant of the triumph of good, to the existence of a God understood, through Kantian influence, as the “moral order” of the world. The recognition between two Is is not direct, for through it I only perceive the other I as my representation, not in itself. I can only reach his reality in an indirect manner, through God himself who is the warrant of the existence of a Moral Order which includes other persons like me necessary in order to accomplish it. For this reason, there is in Fichte a sort of Malebranchean Occasionalism in so far as persons only recognize themselves as such not directly, but through the identification with the mentioned divine Order. In The Destination of Man (1800), he writes: “It doesn't flow directly from you to me and from me to you the knowledge that we have one from the other; we are separated by a limitative insuperable ordering. Only through our common spiritual source we know respectively the one of the other; only in it we know and influence mutually” (II, 301). Compared to the Malebranch introducer, developing Cartesian Ideas, of the existence of an “intelligible physical space”, Fichte is the introducer, developing Kantian Ideas, of an “intelligible moral order”, built from the operatory activities of the individual Is, and not by mere divine revelation, although still warranted by theological assumptions. Such a Moral Order, imposed over the particular wills, will be the guiding Idea which will open the way to the so-called Social Sciences through the Hegelian Idea of the Objective Spirit and that Marx will reinterpret as a mystification of positive historical realities such as the economical struggles causing the structural laws which impose themselves “over the will” of men, or in the functionalist and structuralist Anthropology, as elementary structures of kinship, etc.

With all this the Fichtean Philosophy of the time of Berlin is marked by a theological dependence, even acquiring a mystical tone in his writing The Way Towards the Blessed Life (1806), which has contributed to the contraposition between the revolutionary Fichte of Jena and the religious and conservative Fichte of Berlin. Nevertheless, it can be admitted that there is a basic continuity, a nuclear structure or common knot, between all the different and numerous versions of his Doctrine of Science. In such sense, Fichte never abandoned his Doctrine of the Three Principles which made him famous in Jena. It could be said then, that as well as Descartes would have been the precursor of the Kant's “Copernican Turn” when starting with such good step, as the poet Peguy would say, from the “I think”, although understanding such I as a substance which requires the participation and warranty in its evidences of the infinite divine Substance, Fichte is the precursor of the comprehension of theoretical knowledge as a knowledge that is constructed and is founded in practical knowledge, just as, for instance, Piaget's Epistemology will claim (see my article “Fichte a la luz de Piaget”), but he was unable to find a foundation of moral knowledge without appealing to theological beliefs.

Regarding his political doctrines, Fichte considers that economical Liberalism, by itself, cannot end with misery or economical crisis, and he proposes, in The Closed Commercial State (1800), the intervention of the State in the Economy. The State cannot allow the free exchange of goods, in the same way as it doesn't allow the free circulation of individuals, but rather it must intervene controlling their production and flux, with the end of avoiding economical crisis. The citizens are defined by the property they acquire with their job, but such property must not be understood in the substantialist way of Locke, or Kant, for example, of a thing possessed, but rather of something only necessary in accordance to the capacity or operatory activity of he who possesses it. Fichte, unlike Kant, doesn't accept the death penalty as an unilateral right of the State. For when the citizen accepts the Social Contract on which the State is based, he cannot renounce to an non-renounceable right, the right to live, putting his life on the hands of the State. Against a Kant who is a convinced supporter of the death penalty, Fichte claims that the penalty is not an end in itself, only a mean to reintegrate the individual in society, reestablishing the reciprocal acknowledgement of his rights. In the situations in which the dialectic of the reciprocal acknowledgement among citizens as human beings, with equal rights, becomes impossible, with the risk of the destruction of the moral order, the offender, in so far as he declares himself an outlaw, must be condemned to live outside of human society, either being expelled to live in the jungle or in the not colonized lands. Only when this is not possible, as it still was in the nineteenth century, the death penalty is exceptionally justified. But then, according to Fichte, there is no proper penalty, but shame, for we are not talking any more of an individual but of a social enemy, a parasite. This way society treats the criminal with his own law, the law of the jungle.

Fichte was always a defender of the rational political principles that had arisen in the French Revolution, but he opposed Napoleon when he invaded Prussia in the sense that he did not represent the expansion of the French Revolution, but rather its involution to feudal despotism. In this he agrees with Auguste Comte, who saw Napoleon, in his attempt to restore Imperial Monarchy, like Julian the Apostate who aimed to restore paganism against Christianity, opposing to the general progress that which was civilizing. Unlike Hegel, who saw in Napoleon the incarnation of the universal spirit, Fichte proposed his destruction. For this reason he fought against him courageously in his Address to the German Nation (1808) pronounced in front of a crowded auditory in the Academy of Sciences in Berlin, under the occupation of the Napoleonic troops.

The revolutionary France, as the civilizing torchbearer, had failed and Germany had to take over, according to Fichte. This was a surprising claim, for at that moment Germany was not more that a decadent aggregate of small principalities resulting of the decadence and fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire. Germany had been, as Fichte points out in his famous Address, the origin of European civilization, mixing the Christian of Roman origin with the ancestral traditions of the Germanic people. However, during Kant´s time, Fichte saw that the Germans started to show certain traits of cultural supremacy in Europe. For this reason Germany would be, once its unification as a modern and democratic nation had been done, Humanity´s new civilizing engine, after France. Nevertheless, Fichte remains cautious, warning his people that, if Germany failed, the only one who could take over was the country which according to the democrats of the time could harbor such hope and avoid a regression to political despotism: the USA. In such a sense Fichte's political ideas are those of a democratic reformer, far from the political totalitarianisms with which he is usually related.

Fichte's philosophy produced a great impact during his time. Friedrich Schlegel said that the three most important events during his time had been the French Revolution, Fichte's philosophy and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. He was a very deep philosopher and, although Hegel and Schelling understood what was essential to his philosophy in Jena, they ignored great part of his later evolution offered in his courses of the University of Berlin. University known as “Humboldt”, which he himself contributed to found and of which he was the first Rector. He died on the 29^th of January of 1814 from a virus transmitted by his wife, Johanna Maria Rahn, niece of the poet Klopstock, which she got during her service as a volunteer nurse in the War of Liberation of Prussia from the Napoleonic occupation.

ManuelF. Lorenzo

 

 

 

(Translated into English by Luis Fernández Pontón)

Sobre la crítica de Ortega a la Restauración

De Ortega y Gasset, en España, parece que solo se acuerdan algunos, como de Santa Bárbara, cuando truena. Pues ahora que, en esta Segunda Restauración que nos ha tocado vivir, está tronando a consecuencia de los rayos de la crisis económica que caen provocando incendios y destrucciones devastadoras de la credibilidad de los políticos, de los banqueros y de sus grandes medios de comunicación, casi un siglo después es cuando se vuelve a leer aquel famoso discurso de Ortega del Teatro de la Comedia titulado “Vieja y nueva política” del 23 de Marzo de 1914, con el que fundó la Liga para la Educación Política Española. Allí Ortega critica certeramente los males de la Restauración con la famosa acusación de la separación creciente de una España real y vital frente a una España oficial corrupta y mediocre, deseando y prediciendo la  muerte de la Restauración Canovista, tras la cual una nueva política debería desarrollar una nueva España nacional e industrializada. Eso fue lo que realmente ocurrió en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, aunque el precio que se hubo de pagar fue la Guerra Civil y la larga dictadura franquista. Por eso algunos, como Pio Moa, consideran que el precio fue excesivo y podía haberse evitado si Ortega y los llamados Regeneracionistas no se hubiesen empeñado en hundir aquel Régimen que, a pesar de sus defectos, dio una larga estabilidad política al país que estaba empezando a mejorar la situación de miseria y analfabetismo secular. Por tanto, mucho cuidado con volver a aquel Ortega. La crítica que busca destruir la actual Restauración por defectos similares, puede conducirnos a una nueva tragedia que solo los muy necios aceptarían. Pues, cabe todavía una regeneración interna del Sistema actual, como cabía entonces si la fuerzas intelectuales de los Ortega y demás, combinadas con los nuevos partidos revolucionarios y separatistas, no se hubieran unido para acabar con la llamada Monarquía de Sagunto.

La cosa podía ser razonable si no fuera que, en vez de a Ortega, se está combatiendo a una caricatura deformada. Pues, a diferencia de Regeneracionistas como Joaquín Costa, por ejemplo, la crítica de Ortega a la Restauración no va dirigida tanto a los abusos evidentes (la oligarquía y el caciquismo) como a lo que él denomina los “usos”, esto es, a aquello que resulta necesariamente de la propia estructura del edificio que Cánovas (gran historiador aunque mediocre hombre de Estado, según el propio Ortega) había diseñado. Pues la Restauración se habría hundido necesariamente por defectos de diseño interno, como un barco mal concebido para navegar en las procelosas y atrasadas aguas españolas. Por ello, nadie la destruyó, sino que ella misma se vino abajo, como un edificio que no soporta su uso. Ortega habría obtenido tal predicción como resultado de un frío análisis, propio de la mente de un matemático que contempla como la mayor tragedia ver una teoría, perfecta en su forma, que cae asesinada por un hecho. Para ello hay que leer su brillante análisis en una obra que, los Pio Moa, Antonio García-Trevijano (que también se ha manifestado intentando desacreditar a Ortega) y otros, no parecen haber leído o al menos no parecen tener una mínima noción de ella. Me refiero a La redención de la provincias, publicada en forma de artículos periodísticos durante la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera (el cual precisamente censuró el termino Autonomía, allí propuesto por Ortega rara reorganizar el Estado, que tuvo que ser cambiado por el de Gran Comarca) y publicada finalmente en forma de libro con el advenimiento de la República. He expuesto en forma resumida este libro en un trabajo titulado “Idea leibniziana de una Constitución Autonómica para España según Ortega”, por lo que solo indicaré aquí lo esencial para el caso. Con ello se ve como en España se echa de menos cierta formación filosófica, y no solo de especialista en historia, derecho o economía, para orientar la política nacional.

Pues Ortega lleva a cabo un análisis de la Restauración al modo geométrico spinozista. Un análisis al modo de lo que los matemáticos llaman un demostración por Reducción al Absurdo: se parte de una hipótesis que, al desarrollarla, nos conduce a una contradicción, la cual debe ser superada retirando la hipótesis inicial y buscando otro camino que nos permita evitarla. Antes de proceder, hace como Galileo cuando parte de un plano inclinado ideal, sin rozamientos, etc. Así Ortega considera a la Constitución canovista de 1876 como un diseño Ideal que se debe considerar en un funcionamiento sin “rozamientos” (los rozamientos se solucionaban con el aceite engrasador de las corrupciones de los políticos encargados de velar por su cumplimiento, etc.). En tal sentido ideal se debe analizar su funcionamiento. Una vez elaborada y aprobada la Constitución, relata Ortega, se convocan las elecciones y los partidos acuden a los mítines exponiendo sus programas basados en diferentes ideologías, conservadores, liberales, etc. Pero, entonces surge algo inesperado e imprevisto en el diseño: una gran parte del electorado no vota, se abstiene. El hecho tozudo tiene lugar en los distritos rurales. No tendría el menor inconveniente para el buen funcionamiento de la Constitución propuesta sino fuera que tales distritos, en una España todavía predominantemente agrícola, son la mayoría. No obstante el Gobierno, considerando esta como un defecto no esencial, sino superable con el tiempo, toma la decisión de nombrar diputados gubernamentales, los llamados “cuneros”, en los distritos en que no hay quórum electoral. De un modo meramente  formal se cumple así el expediente, aunque falseando la legitimidad democrática. Con el tiempo los distritos rurales son organizados por caciques que por pucherazo electoral (compra de votos, etc.) consiguen ser elegidos acabando con el predominio de la abstención. Ahora sí se cumple con la legitimidad electoral, pues la mayoría de los diputados son realmente elegidos y no impuestos autocráticamente por el Gobierno, pero pagando el precio de que resultan distritos electorales sanos (las grandes ciudades) y otros podridos (las zonas rurales).

Al ir creciendo los distritos caciqueados hasta conseguir que fuese mayor el número de diputados que los representaban en la Cortes, que el de los que representaban a las fuerzas más modernas de las grandes ciudades y de los “cuneros”gubernamentales, se produjo entonces una crisis política en la que el Gobierno central perdió el Poder para gobernar el país, entrándose así en una fase de desgobierno por la rebelión caciquil que podía imponer su particularismo, etc. De ahí que Ortega haya visto la intervención de Primo de Rivera, no tanto como el típico golpe de Estado de la derecha cavernícola, sino como una forma de salvar al Estado central evitando que se viniese abajo en medio de luchas fratricidas y particularistas. Fue, sin embargo, una solución provisional que desembocó en la República. Pero, la República no siguió la vía de moderación que pretendió inculcarle Ortega, entonces en el momento de su mayor influencia intelectual en España. Demostró por ello Ortega una gran prudencia de nuevo al comprender que las fuerzas de izquierda no tenían interés por una Republica democrática y liberal, como la que el proponía, sino que mayoritariamente seguían la dirección del totalitarismo soviético. Ortega entonces condenó la Revolución del 34" y, con su famoso “No es eso, no es eso”, abandonó su intervención directamente política, ya para siempre, pues la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura subsiguiente no dejaban espacio para ello a un demócrata liberal.

Hoy nos encontramos ante la crisis de una 2ª Restauración que vuelve a ser analizada superficialmente por muchos críticos con la cantinela de la “casta” corrupta de los políticos, etc., con lo que todo español se contenta echándole la culpa de los males patrios a los demás, como ya decía el propio Ortega. Estos análisis, aun relatando defectos innegables del actual Sistema político, no tienen la más mínima profundidad filosófica, pues no van más allá de las apariencias. Se detienen en los síntomas sin ver las causas profundas de la enfermedad. Por ello Ortega nos parece actual por su modélico análisis de la Restauración decimonónica realizado en La Redención de las provincias. Deberíamos imitarlo en esto. Por mi parte he ofrecido un pequeño esbozo de análisis, “al modo orteguiano”, de las causas de la crisis de la actual Restauración juancarlista en mi artículo “Oligarquía y Separatismo, dos graves defectos de la actual Democracia española”. En él concluyo que el problema que nos lleva  a la crisis del segundo intento de modernizar políticamente nuestro país es la debilidad filosófica y política de  las llamadas “clases ilustradas” españolas, como en la Restauración decimonónica el problema era, para Ortega, el atrasado ruralismo del país, causante principal del fracaso de la Constitución canovista, valida para los ingleses, a los que se copiaba, pero inútil para una España muy diferente; solo una filosofía profunda, que el historiador Canovas no tenía, podía ayudar a elaborar una Constitución realista hecha a la medida del país. Ahora, desaparecido el atraso rural, el principal problema es otro. Es el problema de lo que Ortega denominaba la debilidad de las"minorías dirigentes". Es la debilidad de lo que se denomina la “tercera España”, que representan las actuales "minorías dirigentes", brillante en tiempos de la República con los Unamuno, Ortega, Marañón, etc., aunque entonces poco influyente electoralmente.

Esta Tercera España ha sido doblemente golpeada en el siglo XX, cuando acababa de nacer, pues sus representantes filosóficos, los llamados "intelectuales", traicionaron, durante la llamada Guerra Fría, su filosófico sacerdocio de buscar la verdad con su adicción mayoritaria al adormecedor opio del sueño dogmático marxista del que, en España, parecen aun no haber despertado, como se lamenta a menudo con razón Pio Moa. Por otra parte han sido  sustituidos, debido a la llamada "rebelión de las masas" que Ortega genialmente diagnosticó, en su papel de influir y crear una opinión pública crítica y filosófica, por un sucedáneo: la también llamada “casta periodística” que se dedican a difundir la banalidad y a la proliferación clónica endogámica de unos periodistas que entrevistan mayormente a otros periodistas en las abundantes tertulias de los medios de comunicación. Necesitamos, por ello, en vez de demonizar a Ortega, como algunos pretenden, retomar su proyecto de una nueva Liga para la Educación Política en la España actual, que se proponga acabar con los particularismo y adormecedores sectarismos intelectuales aun dominantes para elevar el atrasado nivel filosófico hoy reinante. Pues sin eso no conseguiremos hacer estable, eficiente y duradero ningún proyecto de Democracia Liberal que sea realmente efectivo para el progreso y la indispensable modernización inacabada de España.

Manuel F. Lorenzo

El Europeísmo, Ortega y Pio Moa

     La crisis del Euro, abierta en los países del Sur de Europa por la dificultad de hacer frente a sus endeudamientos ruinosos, producidos, en parte, por la facilidad crediticia sin límites que proporcionó el ingreso en tal moneda, ha desatado la crítica a la ideología del Proyecto de Unidad Federal Europea propugnado principalmente por el llamado eje franco-alemán, e incluso, en España, ha despertado una tradición anti-europea que se remonta al Concilio de Trento, con su condena de la Europa Protestante, y que, pasando por el africanista Unamuno, llega hasta nuestros días expuesta de forma brillante en Blogs de gran difusión como el de Pio Moa. El chivo expiatorio habitual suele ser el filósofo Ortega y Gasset: “Quizá la expresión más precisa de esa vana retórica la haya ofrecido Ortega y Gasset con su frase ‘España es el problema, y Europa la solución’. Otras veces he señalado el cúmulo de insensateces en que caía nuestro filósofo cuando especulaba sobre política e historia. Aquella frase carece de lógica, pero es sugerente: sugiere que España funciona mal, o incluso es el mal, y ‘Europa’ el bien”.(Pio Moa, “El Europeismo en España II”, Blog de Intereconomía).

     Hemos tratado de la famosa frase pronunciada por Ortega en un artículo titulado “La solución europea”, pero vamos a retomar el tema de nuevo ya que persiste lo que consideramos un mal entendimiento de Ortega. Pues la solución europea para los problemas de España no era, en el filósofo madrileño, una cuestión meramente económica o política, sino educativa o, como hoy se dice, cultural. La “solución europea” era que España se incorporase a la cultura científica y filosófica que modernamente había florecido en los países como Inglaterra, Francia o Alemania, remediando un retraso secular en tales materias. Pues Ortega, que admiraba más al conde de Saint Simon o a Augusto Comte que a Marx, pensaba que el progreso y la riqueza de tales países se debía en una parte sustancial, no tanto al espíritu revolucionario inculcado por el Protestantismo, puramente destructivo, como a su apuesta por la ciencia y la filosofía moderna, mientras que una España intelectualmente decadente y poco modernizada, permanecía en la miseria y el atraso cultural, económico y social. Esa cultura moderna es la que hoy, con USA a la cabeza, continua siendo estimulada en los países más desarrollados del planeta, marcando un horizonte de civilización y progreso, aunque no exento de aspectos críticos como el diagnosticado por Ortega como "rebelión de las masas", que se ha impuesto históricamente sobre otros como los que intentaron imponer los llamados totalitarismos fascista y comunista. Esa cultura es la que, tras el despegue como potencia industrial en el franquismo, debía desarrollarse en España, pero no lo ha hecho de la forma debida. Lo cual nos ha  conducido al triunfo de una oligarquía de políticos, banqueros y medios de comunicación, caracterizada por la mediocridad de su filosofía (el europeismo utópico que sueña con ceder soberanía a una Europa Federal, p. ej., y que Ortega nunca defendió, como ya expusimos en un artículo titulado "Sobre la unidad europea") y la incapacidad de depurar sus excesos al haber politizado al Poder Judicial y  controlado a los grandes grupos mediáticos. Tales excesos y controles indebidos nos han conducido a la ruina económica en que nos encontramos actualmente como país, sin que se vean en el horizonte la aparición de unas nuevas fuerzas políticas y culturales que nos permitan otear un futuro más esperanzador e ilusionante para la mayoría de los españoles, en especial para los más jóvenes. 

     Ortega tenía, al menos, otra filosofía. Por ello, es preciso recordar, para una mejor comprensión de la frase, que Ortega, en una fase posterior a esta en que pronunció la frase famosa en el discurso de marzo de 1910 en la Sociedad El Sitio de Bilbao, consiguió liberárse de la influencia culturalista alemana de los neokantianos de Marburgo, y se atrevió posteriormente a proponer una nueva filosofía, el llamado Raciovitalismo, que contribuyese a superar la crisis interna de la modernidad europea que estalla en 1914 con la Primera Guerra Mundial. Es decir, que Ortega creía, después de tan terrible conflicto, que España, para solucionar sus problemas de atraso y decadencia, no solo debía modernizarse copiando o imitando las corrientes filosóficas inglesas, francesas o alemanas, sino que debía modernizarse culturalmente lo más originalmente posible (por eso escribió aquello de "nada moderno, muy siglo XX"), para aportar soluciones filosóficas y culturales nuevas que permitiesen a la civilización europea superar la llamada crisis de la Modernidad (aquí puede tener cierto sentido decir, como sostiene Po Moa, que muchos regeneracionistas estaban contagiados por la famosa "leyenda negra", en su rechazo miméticamente tomado de los ideólogos ingleses o franceses, de la España Imperial pero, en Ortega, no se encontrará ni pizca de odio a España, sino solo interés intelectual, amor intellectuallis, en descubrir las causas de nuestra decadencia para poder neutralizarlas. Su famoso diagnóstico de la debilidad y escasez de número e influencia de unas élites excelentes, sigue siendo una constatación en la España democrática actual, tan ayuna de los mejores y tan llena de numerosas mediocridades con mucho poder). Desde luego que era preciso ponerse al día de lo que era la filosofía europea de entonces y por ello llevó a cabo una formidable labor de traducciones y de artículos periodísticos que permitiesen salir a las minorías intelectuales del país de la ignorancia reinante sobre tales materias en las cátedras universitarias mayormente controladas por el clero. Pero con eso no bastaba. Había que llevar a cabo la aportación española a la ciencia y a la filosofía europea. Para eso era necesario la creación de minorías intelectuales formadoras de opinión y de nuevas Ideas en la línea de una aportación nacional española a la filosofía europea, que Ortega orientó hacia el Vitalismo, como hizo ya el joven Unamuno, creyéndolo más acorde para la forma de ser de los españoles, que el descarnado racionalismo cartesiano francés, el marxismo germánico o el positivismo cientificista anglosajón.

     No fue muy lejos en su tarea, debido sobre todo a la crisis que abrió la II Republica y la consiguiente Guerra Civil. Por ello la obra filosófica de Ortega, unos la verán como fracasada o llena de errores, como cuando Pio Moa reprocha a Ortega  su opinión que atribuye la debilidad de las minorías intelectuales españolas, en comparación con las de otros países europeos, a la herencia de unos visigodos alcoholizados de romanismo (Ver su monumental, rigurosa y amena Nueva Historia de España, de la que nos ha parecido especialmente novedosa su periodización). Es fácil decir esto hoy cuando disponemos de un conocimiento riguroso de la Historia medieval española, gracias a historiadores como Sanchez-Albornoz, quien sin embargo en su famosa España un enigma histórico, mantiene la diferencia señalada por Ortega en relación con las élites, aunque la justifica en hechos más positivos y comprobables, como que fue la guerra total y secular contra el Islam la que permitió un igualitarismo social español inusual en el resto de Europa. Pues, a diferencia de los torneos u ocasionales guerras del resto de Europa, los reinos medievales hispánicos debían movilizar a todo el pueblo y de forma bastante prolongada, en unas condiciones que permitieron la apertura de la clase noble a los innumerables héroes de guerra populares suavizando notablemente las rígidas jerarquías medievales. También señala Albornoz que ese estado de guerra total, como ocurrió en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, hacía que las mujeres tuviesen que sustituir a menudo a los hombres en los trabajos agrícolas y artesanos haciéndolas tomar conciencia de su valía e igualdad, de la que algo queda en el famoso mito de Carmen. Ortega, ciertamente, cometió errores históricos, pero también debe reconocerse que libros como España Invertebrada, alumbraron hipotesis que contribuyeron a que otras generaciones iniciasen por fin el estudio riguroso y científico de nuestro oscuro pasado medieval.

     Pero en otros aspectos, como los más estrictamente filosóficos, a otros nos gustaría sugerir que quizás Ortega, con todas sus insuficiencias haya sido una especie de visionario o de profeta, una especie de Moisés que apunta el camino hacía una Tierra Prometida para España y para la Filosofía española, aunque fue condenado a no llegar a pisarla. A Ortega no habría que compararlo con un Husserl o un Heidegger, como a veces se hizo, ya sea para ningunearlo o para engrandecerlo, sino con filósofos que marcan con sus escritos un carácter nacional a la filosofía, como ocurre con el profético Francis Bacon, el cual en una filosofía muy ensayística, y tan poco sistemática como la de Ortega, conduce a  la filosofía inglesa moderna por las sendas del Empirismo. Ortega quiso conducirla hacia el Vitalismo. Habrá que esperar que resulta en el futuro de ello. De momento se le puede reconocer el acierto en la elección de los temas biológicos, vitales, como temas que empiezan a aparecer en nuestro horizonte del siglo XXI como profundos y dignos de preocupación para el futuro, como el "cambio climático", la superpoblación, la manipulación genética, el sentido de la vida, etc. Pero, Ortega, en tanto que no se redujo a ser un filósofo académico, tiene también mucho de gran crítico cultural y en este sentido podría jugar un papel para la cultura española futura como lo jugo un Montaigne con sus ensayos para la cultura francesa moderna o u Lessing para la cultura alemana clásica. Es legítimamente debatible todo ello, pero mal encaminados vamos si se empieza por no diferenciar claramente a Ortega de toda aquella barahunda de los regeneracionistas europeístas o de los actuales europeístas “papanatas”.

Manuel F. Lorenzo 

(Publicado el 5-7-2013)

En el bicentenario de la muerte de Fichte

Este año de 2014 celebramos y conmemoramos el 200 aniversario de la muerte de Johann Gottlieb Fichte, el gran filósofo idealista alemán, discípulo de Kant y genial creador del primer gran sistema filosófico basado en los revolucionarios hallazgos de la filosofía kantiana. Con él se inició el brillante camino que conducirá a la filosofía contemporánea. A pesar de la inmensa fama e influencia que tuvo en su tiempo, Fichte, junto con su inicial y brillante seguidor, Schelling, ha sido relegado posteriormente por figuras como el propio Kant o Hegel. Aunque también Hegel ha padecido, tras la caída del Muro de Berlín, un cierto desinterés por su filosofía. Como se ha señalado, al comienzo del siglo actual:

“…le paradigme continental, dans son opposition à la philosophie anglo-saxonne est, ces dernières années, toléré, accepté ou revendiqué lorsqu’il s’agit de Kant ou Husserl, mais réellement déconsidéré dans son versant purement idéaliste et speculatif” (Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel, Fichte. Réflexion et Argumentation, Vrin, Paris, 2004, p. 7).

No obstante, en la segunda mitad del pasado siglo, se ha iniciado, entre los especialistas, un proceso de rehabilitación y nueva valoración de su filosofía, junto con la del propio Schelling, que ha ido dando frutos al renovar el interés de los estudiosos actuales de aquella época filosófica del llamado Idealismo clásico alemán por ambos filósofos. Un testimonio de ello ha sido el libro, de título significativo, Between Kant and Hegel (Harvard University Press, 2003), de Dieter Heinrich, en el que, invirtiendo el planteamiento del clásico libro de Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, en el que se consideraba a ambos filósofos como meras figuras de transición entre Kant y Hegel, Heinrich resalta precisamente como figuras llenas de interés por sí mismas a Schelling o al poéta Hölderlin y, especialmente, a Fichte, por su concepción del conocimiento, en relación precisa con el auge de la filosofía cognitiva o Philososophy of Mind norteamericana.

Quisiéramos añadir, por nuestra parte, a las voces que se unan al coro conmemorativo de aquel gran filósofo alemán, algunas reflexiones a modo de meditaciones sobre un aspecto que puede despertar de nuevo el interés por la obra fichteana, y que no lo hemos visto tratado en ningún sitio, que es el de la conexión anticipadora de la Teoría del Conocimiento de Fichte desarrollada en su Wissenschaftslehre, con las novedosa y mundialmente influyente concepción del conocimiento humanos desarrollada por Jean Piaget en su Epistemología Genetica.

Justamente en relación con esto, hemos venido proponiendo y desarrollando, en los últimos, años una reforma fundacional de la Filosofía en relación con la nueva concepción del conocimiento introducida por Jean Piaget en la segunda mitad del pasado siglo con el nombre de Epistemología Genética y que, a nuestro juicio, posibilita en muchos de sus resultados el desarrollo de una nueva forma de pensar la realidad que hemos interpretado como el desarrollo de un Pensamiento Hábil (Ver Manuel F. Lorenzo, Introducción al Pensamiento Hábil, 2007). En dicha obra, (p. 18) nos acogíamos precisamente a la definición fichteana de la Filosofía, entendida no como una mera colección o conexión  de Proposiciones (Sammlung von Sätzen), que pueden ser aprendidas,  sino como una cierta visión de las cosas (Ansicht der Dinge), un especial modo de pensar (Denkart), que debemos producir en nosotros mismos.

“ Philosophie ist nicht eine Sammlung von Sätzen, die so gelernt werden, sondern sie ist eine gewisse Ansicht der Dinge, eine besondere Denkart, die man in sich hervorbringen muss”, (J. T. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre nova método, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1994, p. 11).

Pero Fichte no era entonces la mera ocasión para una cita que venía bien, sino que conformaba el surgimiento en la filosofía moderna de lo que denominamos una fundamentación operatiológica del conocimiento que sería científicamente desarrollada por Jean Piaget en el siglo XX. Pues Fichte es el primer filósofo moderno que formula filosóficamente la tesis, que Piaget enarbolará frente a los empirista del Positivismo Lógico o “innatistas” como Chomsky, de que lo esencial para entender el conocimiento humano es la Acción, los hechos-acciones (Tathandlungen) del sujeto cognoscente. De ahí que el estudio y la meditación de la obra fichteana, especialmente de su Wisseschaftslehre, con la dificultad correspondiente de sus múltiples versiones ofrecidas en sus diversos cursos universitarios, haya sido una necesidad para conectar muchos de los brillantes resultados de la Epistemología Genética piagetiana con la renovación de una filosofía actual que pretenda abrirse camino en un mundo post-metafísico. En tal sentido la obra de Fichte plantea serias dificultades por su incompletud y sus continuas remodelaciones, a lo que se une muchas veces el carácter oscuro y difícil de su forma de escribir. Ortega decía, en tal sentido, que Fichte, ebrio de claridades, avanzaba dando tumbos.

Frente a la claridad cartesiana, sin embargo, Fichte se nos aparece como un filósofo oscuro, aunque más profundo. No obstante ello, Ortega consideraba a Fichte, y no a Hegel, como el hombre a batir en la cuestión de la superación del Idealismo y el paso a su Racio-vitalismo. Proponía sustituir la Idea fichteana de Yo, - que Fichte había puesto en lugar del Dios Substancia de Espinoza -, por la de la Vida. Ortega, parodiando al Husserl de las Meditaciones Cartesianas, proponía la formula de llevar a cabo un “cartesianismo de la vida” y no un mero “cartesianismo fenomenológico”, como pretendía Husserl. Esta fórmula de Ortega la hemos usado alguna vez, pero creemos que deberíamos reformularla ahora como un “fichteanismo de la vida”, para precisar nuestra propuesta filosófica de una filosofía operatiológica. Además, es preciso recordar que el modelo que Fichte tomó para desarrollar plenamente el kantismo no fue precisamente Descartes, sino más bien Spinoza, cuyo sistema metafísico “dogmático”, en términos kantianos, se convirtió en un contra modelo para desarrollar el sistema crítico-idealista fichteano. Un “espinosismo de la libertad” era la formula que mejor correspondía a las filosofías sistemáticas del propio Fichte, pero también de Schelling y Hegel como señala D. Heinrich en Between Kant and Hegel.

En tal sentido, mutatis mutandis, hoy nos parece que es Fichte, y no Kant o Hegel, como quieren Schopenhauer o Marx, respectivamente, el contra-modelo de referencia a seguir para superar el Idealismo moderno, en el sentido preciso de pasar de un “fichteanismo idealista” a un positivo “fichteanismo de la vida”, mejor que al orteguiano "cartesianismo de la vida", y que tanta semejanza tiene con el enfoque operacional piagetiano en la explicación del conocimiento humano, aunque el propio Piaget no fuese consciente de ello, al menos si tenemos en cuenta la ausencia de referencias a Fichte en sus principales obras en comparación con Kant, Hegel o Husserl. Debemos recordar aquí que fue precisamente Fichte quien sistematizó la filosofía kantiana siguiendo el modelo de filosofar de Espinoza. Con ello, aquel gran filósofo hispano-judio dejó de ser tratado en las Historias de la Filosofía como un "perro muerto" y su modo de pensar fue, en cierto sentido, incorporado y revivido en el pensamiento alemán de Schelling y Hegel. Por ello, al invertir a Fichte, volvemos, en cierto modo, a revivir en España a nuestro ancestro Espinoza, aunque dentro de una filosofía positiva que se quiere crítica y no ya dogmatica o idealista.

ManuelF. Lorenzo

Hace falta una tercera España con fuerza electoral

Llegábamos en un anterior artículo (“Oligarquíay Separatismo, dos males de la actual Democracia española”) a la conclusión de que era urgente y necesaria la existencia de una fuerza electoral de centro y basada en el voto de la minoría que constituyen en España las clases profesionales ilustradas. Minoría electoral que actuase de balance of power entre los dos grandes partidos mayoritarios, conservador y socialista, para sustituir al arbitraje chantajista que han venido ejerciendo las minorías separatistas vasca y catalana, y que nos ha llevado a una crisis de desgobierno del poder central, imposibilitado por estar dividido ante la cuestión de cómo mantener la unidad de España. Un poder central que  además parece incapaz de dibujar un nuevo proyecto económico nacional que nos permita salir de la crisis en que nos hallamos e incapaz de controlar y corregir los escandalosos excesos de corrupciones y abusos del poder que están aflorando continuamente en los medios, afectando a la entera clase política, sindical, bancaria, industrial, etc, dominante en las últimas décadas. En tal sentido manteníamos la semejanza de la actual Restauración Monarquica con la llamada Restauración Decimonónica en la existencia de una Democracia mezclada con la Oligarquía; pero veíamos la diferencia en que el rasgo que destruyó a la Restauración Decimonónica fue el caciquismo electoral, en tanto que ahora, debido a la desaparición del ruralismo tras el duro y dictatorial, aunque finalmente exitoso, proceso de industrialización de España bajo el franquismo, el defecto político que amenaza con destruir el actual régimen político ya no es el pucherazo electoral de los caciques rurales sino que es el bien organizado y electorálmente poderoso secesionismo separatista catalán y vasco.

Según nos vamos metiendo más y más en las futuras batallas electorales tengo la sensación de que solo hay dos Españas que cuentan, que ocupan de forma abrumadora los medios de comunicación, sobre todo los telediarios de las grandes cadenas, en  los que el tuya mía, tuya mía, entre el PSOE y el PP, se impone de forma aplastante. Realmente esto no es nuevo, sino que viene sucediendo desde el fin de la UCD de Adolfo Suárez, cuando el bipartidismo se impone. Lo nuevo es que, hasta Zapatero, los dos grandes partidos asumieron, por lo menos en su propaganda, los valores democrático-liberales que eran propios de aquel proyecto de una España liberal y democrática de los Ortega, Madariaga y demás. Aunque, de hecho, se fueron introduciendo ya algunos deslizamientos y perversiones como la muerte de Montesquieu, proclamada por Alfonso Guerra y plasmada en la politización de la Justicia, -muerto que Aznar, con mayoría absoluta, no quiso resucitar y que el actual ministro de Justicia, Gallardón, ha vuelto a rematar-, o las concesiones excesivas en materia de competencias lingüísticas y educativas a los micro-nacionalismos insaciables. Pero en general no se tocó en sus bases el pacto constitucional, fruto optimo de la transición a la democracia desde el franquismo.

Con Zapatero todo esto empieza a cambiar y se intenta que reaparezcan las dos Españas machadianas. En el PSOE se impone su ala más radical y antiliberal, como ya ocurrió en la II Republica y, como toda acción provoca una reacción en sentido contrario, el PP, aunque sin muchas ganas de batalla, se apresta a defenderse, como es natural. En tiempos de Zapatero no se quemaban Iglesias, como en la República, pero se empieza a atacar sedes del PP, o a boicotear sus mítines o conferencias en la Universidad, ante la pasividad y poca contundencia de los instrumentos policiales y judiciales.  Si esta situación continuase al agravarse la crisis económica, lo más probable es que la derecha española, que no se deja amilanar fácilmente, como sabemos por la historia de la República, comenzara a organizar o tolerar una respuesta que se tome la justicia por su mano. Situación sumamente peligrosa, como sabemos por experiencias pasadas, debido a las tendencias cainitas que padecemos los españoles.

Por ello es necesario que, ante el empate de fuerzas que volverá a ocurrir tras la previsible perdida de la mayoría absoluta por el PP de Rajoy, surja una nueva o varias fuerzas electorales que recojan la política de una España liberal, como era la denominada tercera España, que hoy ni el PSOE ni el PP toleran prefiriendo la alianza con los nacionalismos totalitarios y secesionistas. Esta nueva fuerza que parece perfilarse con mayor posibilidad de obtener algún escaño, como anticipa las últimas encuesta del CIS y de diversos medios periodísticos, es la del partido fundado por la eurodiputada Rosa Diez, el filósofo Fernando Savater y otros intelectuales a imitación de Ciudadanos de Cataluña. Por fín parece moverse algo en el mundo de ciertas minorías intelectuales españolas, que parecían haber desertado para siempre de su necesaria función crítica, adormecidas por los cantos de sirena y las prebendas de unos poderosos y despóticos grupos político-mediáticos como lo fue durante décadas el imperio de Polanco y el grupo PRISA. El diario El País fue su buque estrella despues de traicionar el espíritu liberal orteguiano que presidió su proyecto fundacional.

Es curioso observar en los últimos años como los intelectuales, como Fernando Savater, desertan del PSOE, siendo sustituidos por los que podíamos llamar los “sentimentales”, esto es, los artistas de la farándula y el espectáculo que son hoy los que firman los manifiestos antaño reservados a aquellos. Manifiestos más sentimentales que intelectuales, puesto que sus tomas de posición están más orientadas por la víscera, ayuna de estudio y de poco sentido común, que otra cosa. La derecha ya hace tiempo que se ha quedado huérfana de su tradicional “intelectual orgánico”, la Iglesia católica, pues los nuevos tiempos democráticos imponen ciertas distancias ideológicas necesarias. A su vez los intelectuales liberales, como Jiménez Losantos o Pio Moa, empiezan tambien a  recelar de los acomplejados líderes del PP. Por ello el nuevo partido de Rosa Diez tiene posibilidades de convertirse en el nuevo partido de los intelectuales españoles. En tal sentido recuerda al Partido Reformista de Melquíades Alvarez o a la Agrupación de Intelectuales al Servicio de la República de Ortega, Marañón y Ayala.

La comparación no es superficial ya que puede tener un calado más hondo, en el sentido de que una preocupación esencial de aquellos partidos republicanos era dar presencia en la vida política nacional a las minorías intelectuales, las “elites”, que Ortega echaba de menos en España, en comparación con lo que ocurría en nuestros poderosos y avanzados vecinos franceses, ingleses y alemanes. Dichas minorías intelectuales, integradas por profesores, humanistas, científicos, médicos, abogados, lo que se denomina personas cultas en general, que parecen coincidir con el perfil de votante del partido de Rosa Diez, debían aportar a la dirección política del país un peso de seriedad y competencia, avalado por el conocimiento de la historia y de las complejidades de las modernas sociedades industriales, que pueda influir, por el peso arbitral de sus votos, en la dirección última del destino de los españoles, para que este no se configure únicamente por fuerzas económicas y sociales polarizadas en una lucha ciega, sorda e irreflexiva, como ha ocurrido en trágicos enfrentamientos pasados.

Precisamente, una de las causas que condujeron a la guerra civil fratricida entre españoles, llena de ignorancia y fanatismo, fue la dificultad y el retraso de España en sustituir a una élite intelectual medieval, como era la Iglesia, la cual todavía en la Restauración decimonónica, que pretendió modernizar el país, ostentaba la mayoría de las cátedras universitarias, por una élite científica e intelectual ya entonces con importantes figuras como Ramón y Cajal, Clarín, o el movimiento krausista, que permanecieron marginados por los políticos del famoso turno entre Canovas y Sagasta. A pesar de los esfuerzos de acciones aisladas como la Extensión Universitaria en la Universidad de Oviedo, el pueblo, en progresivo proceso de proletarización, permanecía en la ignorancia más absoluta sobre la nueva sociedad industrial que se estaba abriendo camino, un poco tardíamente, en España. Dicha ignorancia le conduciría a caer en manos del fanatismo proletario fomentado por los partidos revolucionarios obreristas que se constituían entonces. 

                                                                     

La organización de unas minorías intelectuales que asumiesen los principios de la sociedad moderna había dado un paso muy grande, con respecto al siglo XIX, por obra de lideres intelectuales como Unamuno y Ortega. Fue la primera vez que España pudo ofrecer al mundo, agrupados en la institución cultural de la mítica Residencia de Estudiantes,  un conjunto de nombres en los diferentes campos de la cultura y la ciencia moderna, desde Ortega hasta Dalí, pasando por Buñuel , Ramón y Cajal o Severo Ochoa, con amplia resonancia y efecto internacional. Pero el intento de reconducir la República, por la intervención de tales intelectuales, señaladamente las agrupaciones de Ortega y Melquíades Álvarez, evitando el enfrentamiento trágico entre los extremistas antidemocráticos, fracasó. La guerra civil y la dictadura franquista fueron los corolarios de aquella esperanza que trajo la II Republica.

Hoy nos encontramos en una situación en que una nueva Restauración democrática está conduciendo, en su desarrollo bipartidista, a nuevos enfrentamientos, ya no tanto en torno a un radicalismo social organizado, sino en torno a la cuestión territorial y lingüística, con amenazas serias de secesión de algunas partes de España. Esperemos y confiemos en que la irrupción del nuevo partido de Rosa Diez y Savater, y de otros que buscan ocupar el verdadero centro, permita que el poder moderador de los votos de tales minorías intelectuales se imponga, por su posibilidad de hacer de arbitro moderador, (desplazando al nefasto arbitrismo de los nacionalista vascos y catalanes) sobre las tendencias bárbaras, ignorantes y fanáticas que amenazan con apoderarse de nuevo de un pueblo al que se pretende, desde la llamada Transición, mantener alejado  de la ilustración y el progreso por medio del monopolio de los grandes medios de comunicación, singularmente la televisión hoy dominada por la cultura de la banalidad y el entretenimiento. Es la única esperanza de regeneración que vislumbramos a corto plazo. A medio plazo se requiere algo más profundo, como sería el cumplimiento del programa orteguiano de introducir, por medio de las minorías culturales que han resistido a la corrupción cultural y política del actual Sistema oligarquico, pagando el precio de una especie de muerte civil y un desplazamiento de las altas magistraturas por los intelectuales arrivistas del PSOE o del PP, una filosofía que de nueva vida y racionalidad al pensamiento y a las Ideas que deben presidir y dirigir la necesaria crítica filosófica, sin la cual debe abandonarse toda seria esperanza de regeneración y progreso.

Manuel F. Lorenzo

Hegel and Aristotle

It is a common place among German Philosophy historians to consider Hegel as the culmination of Modern Philosophy and to compare him with what Aristotle meant for Ancient Philosophy. In this sense he was called by some of his contemporary followers the “German Aristotle”. Marx himself as a member of the so-called “Left Hegelians”, echoes and takes this denomination seriously in his doctoral thesis (See David McLellan, Marx before Marxism, Macmillan, Edinburgh, 1970, p. 52 ff.). Hegel, with his speculative System, would mark, according to Marx, the end of a classical period and the beginning of a very different one, the period that we call Contemporary Philosophy, in the same ways as Aristotle was with his encyclopedic philosophical work the speculative culmination of Greek Classical Philosophy placing himself at the gates of a new period, the Alexandrine or Hellenistic period, that followed the previous philosophy and marked the preponderance of the practical philosophical interests of the new schools of Stoics, Epicureans, etc. Marxism, Vitalism, Positivism or Existentialism, would be the modern equivalent of such Hellenistic schools likewise more oriented to action than to pure speculation.

This is already well known. What remains to be specified is in what sense, not merely historical or external, can the similarity between Hegel and Aristotle be grasped. And so, from an internally philosophical point of view, we believe that the greatness of both philosophers resides in having elaborated a conception of reality under the shape of a very simple structure, but that can be applied to every existing thing, closing a rational and global comprehension very difficult to overcome. In fact, Aristotelean philosophy was unsurpassed in its fundamental structure for centuries. It is also said (as Derrida did) about Hegel's philosophy that all contemporary philosophical rebellion against it is a futile task, for when the rebels finally thought that they had definitely freed themselves from Hegel, he appeared again when turning around any corner. Proof of this would be that the Marxist rebellion itself would have also failed with the triumph of liberal democracy and the return to Hegel that Fukuyama advocates. But lets see, then, what is that powerful structure that both philosophers would have created.

In Aristotle's case, it is the Idea of individual Substance understood as a hylomorphic compound. Against Plato, he held that the Forms or Ideas do not exist separately from the matter and in another world, but rather that the individual substances themselves, the existing beings are compounds of Matter and Form. This conception of the Substance could have been taken by Aristotle from the observation of craftsmen activities so humble and quotidian as pottery in which an at first formless matter, such as clay, is modeled or given formed. But its interest resides in that Aristotle manages to apply it in the manner of a fractal repetition to all the parts or strata in which reality is presented. In such a way that when he considers physical objects he understands them as compounds of matter and form. When he deals with living beings he interprets them as compounds of body (matter) and soul (form). When he deals with a social entity, such as a City-state, he understands it as featuring a matter, the civil body of the citizens organized according to a determinate form of State (Monarchy, Oligarchy or Democracy). In this way, Aristotle managed to elaborate a vision of reality that covered in a rational manner all that exists. He even thought of the Idea of God as a especial immaterial entity, as a Pure Form separated from all matter.

In Hegel's case, the fundamental Idea is not that of a static Substance, but rather that of a dynamic Substance, that of a Being that is Subject, something whose existence consists in becoming, in being realized in a temporal process. Hegel himself expresses this very well in his Prologue to his most famous work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, when he says that what is at stake is to understand that which exists absolutely, that is, the true ultimate ground of reality, not only as a Substance but also and mainly as a Subject, as Spirit (Geist). However, the essence of subjectual realities is not grasped through static divisions such as Aristotelean hylomorphism, but through dynamic divisions given in time. It looks like Hegel, in order to figure out the essential structure of subjectual processes, was inspired by his predecessor Fichte, who postulated the dialectic of the Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis in order to understand reality (although Hegel would modify this Fichtean scheme) and in an observation of the revolutionary processes, as the one that occurred in the neighboring France in his youth, in which a struggle or social movement appears whereby there is a transition from one situation (the Bourbon Monarchy) to its opposite (the Convention of Jacobin terror) and after which comes an overcoming of terror (the Thermidorian Directory). Hegel understands such a political process as following a ternary logical order that he will fractally project to all reality. Heraclitus with his panta rei (everything flows) is preferred by Hegel to Aristotle's Parmenidean fixism.

However, in a similar fractal way as the Stagirite, Hegel will use this basic ternary structure to organize all reality in the repetitive manner of the whole in the parts. This way he divides his System in three parts, following such dialectical order: Logic, Nature and Spirit, which represent three phases whereby reality is considered as identified with rationality (“all that is real is rational and all that is rational is real” claims Hegel), In itself (Logic), For itself (Nature) and In and for itself (Spirit). In turn the Logic is subdivided in three parts: the Logic of Being, of Essence and of the Concept. Nature is studied in three strata or logical moments: mechanical, physical and organic. The Spirit is analyzed as Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit. In turn the Subjective Spirit is subdivided in Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology. The Objective Spirit in Law, Morality and Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit). The Ethical Life in Family, Civil Society and State. The State itself appears in History as Oriental State (only one is free: the despot), Greek City-State (some are free) and the modern democratic State (all are free). Finally, the Absolute Spirit is subdivided in Art, Religion and Philosophy. Each of them in turn is subdivided in three, etc.

It is said that although Aristotelean hylomorphism kept the coherence and broadness of its systematic philosophical vision of reality for centuries, many particular aspects of its ethical, political or logical conceptions started to be overcome by Hellenistic philosophy, and Marx in his doctoral studies saw in them and not in the Aristotelean philosophy the germs of the modern world with his humanism, which comes from the Stoics, etc. In a similar way it could be said of Hegel that what will surely remain for a long time in the future is his systematic dialectical way of considering reality as a process, as a becoming that is making itself moved by its internal contradictions. That which can be overcome in his philosophy, such as his Idealism, long since began to be overcome by his most eminent critics such as the old Schelling, Schopenhauer or Marx himself.

Manuel F. Lorenzo

(Translated into English by Luis Fernández Pontón)

The Hellenistic Philosophical Schools and Contemporary Philosophy (III)

After having emphasized in a comparative analysis between the Greco-Roman Hellenistic philosophical world and Contemporary Philosophy, in a previous article with the same title, that Stoicism had been the philosophical movement of greatest influence and importance in the ideological unification which occurred at the end of the Roman Empire with Constantine's triumphant Christianity, and that a similar functional role, in the globalizing ideological tendency which seems to start to impose itself in the most advanced democracies of the world, could correspond in Western thought, under the North American supremacy, to a renewed positivist philosophy, we will try to complement such analysis with the consideration of the role, likewise positive, although less fundamental, that the contributions of the other great Hellenistic philosophical school had, that of the Epicureans, in the configuration of that resulting new religious ideological conception which was the mentality or way of understanding and giving sense to the world of medieval Christianity. And this, in relation to the humanistic ideological virtual unification, not anymore theist monotheist, that is beginning to powerfully crystallize in Western societies under the aegis of North America.

Regarding Epicureanism we must point out that its initial failure is usually situated around  the second century AD, in which the number of followers of such doctrine, spread through a vast number of Hellenistic cities, remarkably diminishes at the same time that the number of Christians considerably increases in an unstoppable manner: “[The Church] had by the end of the second century become a much stronger and influential organism than Epicureanism had ever been” (B. Farrington, The faith of Epicurus, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967, p. 146). Later the Epicurean movement would completely disappear after the Edict of the emperor Constantine which legalized the Christians, their direct competitors, converting to Christianity even many of its followers. The Christian movement, which had taken the Idea of Equality of the human genre from the Stoics, especially took, nevertheless, from the Epicureans the way of organizing the basic communities sustained in the personal relationship of fraternity, very similar to the friendship which grounded the communes or “gardens” founded by Epicurus, following the model of the Garden in Athens. The forthcoming monastical medieval life, especially in the conventual Cistercian version, follows this model of organization, in a functional comparative sense similar to the one which also sustains the similarity between the first Christian hermits, who went to live to the desert (the film Simon of the Desert by Luis Buñuel is a humorous reconstruction of those anchorites) despising the comfortable life of the polis, and the Athenian Cynic philosophers who intended to live a more authentic and wise life dispensing of the superfluous citizen comforts.

Furthermore, Christians imitated also the propagandistic techniques created by Epicurus: “In the Christian era before the age of Constantine Epicureans and Christians had much in common. Their method of propaganda, by word of mouth; and their method of holding their scattered communities together, by an epistolary literature were common to both; and since Epicureans were the earlier in the field by three centuries the pattern was probably of their making. Both communities faced the problem of the style to be employed in addressing themselves to a wide public. Epicurus tried to use words in their ordinary acceptation. Cicero complained that the Latin popularizers of Epicureanism wrote in a uncultivated style. The Christian Fathers, in order to be understood by all often avoided the politer forms of speech” (B. Farrington, op.cit., p. 144-5). Christianity incorporates such organizational techniques with Saint Paul. For this reason, it is not accidental that the main works of Epicurus are the letters to Menoeceus, to Pythocles, to the friends of Lampsacus, to the friends of Egypt, etc., and those of Saint Paul are the epistle to the Corinthians, to the Galatians, to Philemon, to Timothy, etc. 

Moreover, the Epicureans in contrast to the Stoics summed up the essential of their philosophy in a simple and easy to understand book, the Tetrapharmakos, used regularly in the teaching of the catechumens, women and men of any age, just as the Christians will do secularly with their catechesis: “Pupils could be male or female, old or young, even children were admitted, but not all were resident. Resident adults were called fellow-students in philosophy; elementary classes were taken all day long in any available corner of the garden. The pupils were said to be 'in course of preparation', for which the Greek term was kataskeuazomenoi, a forerunner of the Christian term catechumens” (B. Farrington, op.cit., p. 126). It is true that Epicureans and Christians differed philosophically, for the former were supporters of an atomistic materialism and the latter were creationist spiritualists. However, they agreed in two essential things: to overcome the fear of arbitrary pagan gods and not to fear death; although for different causes, the former basing themselves in pure reason and the latter in a new faith which strengthened itself relying on the Skeptic school's constant and increasing criticism of knowledge, both empirical and rational, of Stoics and Epicureans, from Pyrrho to Aenesidemus or Sextus Empiricus. For this reason, Skepticism was also incorporated to the ultimate Christian synthesis, insofar as it was critical and undermining of the rational dogmatism of such schools.

Accordingly Epicureanism, despite its failure as an alternative and radical movement of social change in the mid and long term, contributed with many aspects in its way of understanding philosophy to the constitution of the ultimate ideological synthesis of the Roman Empire which makes its way with the uprising of Christianity, not only as a mere official religion that substitutes pagan polytheism, but as something more important, as a new “spiritual power”, as Auguste Comte would say, of the so-called medieval organic society that finally substitutes the constantly ideologically divided, along its creative although also troubled and insecure existence, Greco-Roman society.

Such a comparative analysis leads us to think that the humanist positivist philosophy which has its origin in Auguste Comte, and that has succeeded in the USA against its Marxist rival or other less influential European philosophical movements, such as Nietzschean Vitalism or Existentialism, will not monopolize in the future, in the form of a Pensée Unique, the great synthesis of a sort of Comtean Religion of Humanity which seems to be breaking its way in the ideological horizon of the most industrialized countries. For many aspects of ideological organization, techniques of propaganda of a philosophy for everybody and not only for an elite of scientists and sages, moral aspects, etc., will surely be conserved, taken and imitated from the work of a great thinker as Marx. For, just as the great Epicurus made serious mistakes in his Physics when he claimed against Democritus the necessity of granting freedom to the atoms (the clinamen) in order to explain the formation of the Cosmos (granting a sort of freedom to the atoms or to the electrons would make many physicist laugh nowadays), we could seriously consider that also Marx made a mistake, e.g., in his scientific economic assumption of the existence of a surplus value that was taken from the worker to explain the value of the produced commodities. The rival theory of economics, Marginalism, explains much better and with a great mathematical precision the value that a commodity should have without resorting to such hypotheses of an alienation of value. Nonetheless, other aspects of the Marxist philosophy such as its insistence on the realization (Verwirklichung) of Philosophy in practical life, on extending philosophy to general education and popularizing it with that sort of Tetrapharmakos that is the Communist Manifesto, although with other contents, will surely persist and be necessary in order to configure the global ideological synthesis toward which we seem to move in the Western World. The so-called movement of the Indignados (the Outraged), the protest against the new economical and social abuses that appear in the stage of a global scale industrialization, will surely be motives enough for new ideological movements that will need to use many of those philosophical aspects which will be conserved as philosophical acquisitions and remain in the future. For this reason, we can conclude by saying that in the struggle of the main movements in Contemporary Philosophy, just as it happened in Hellenistic Philosophy, although in different measure, all of them will have something essential to contribute in the configuration of the Future Globalized Society that seems to be reserved to the inhabitants of planet Earth and that so many futurist series have begun to depict in the contemporary social imaginary. 

Manuel F. Lorenzo

(Translated into English by Luis Fernández Pontón)